The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in 2016
The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) is a private diplomacy organisation founded on the principles of humanity, impartiality and independence. Its mission is to help prevent, mitigate, and resolve armed conflict through dialogue and mediation.

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He Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) is a private diplomacy organisation which works to prevent, mitigate and resolve armed conflicts and crises through dialogue and mediation.

Founded on the bedrock principles of humanity, impartiality and independence, the organisation is motivated by a simple vision: Mediation for peace.

Wars, uprisings, political crises, contested electoral processes, or potentially violent political transitions – every situation is unique. In each case, HD works with stakeholders to find the solutions which best fit the context. In some instances, HD opens channels of communication with, and mediates directly between, conflict parties at the highest level, providing a confidential space for them to explore options for a negotiated settlement or for humanitarian access. At other times, HD supports or facilitates dialogue with a wider range of representatives, including civil society as well as national and community leaders.

HD may also step back to discreetly facilitate the work of other mediators. The organisation may work collaboratively with third parties to support their work as lead facilitators, or provide technical support to processes led by other entities.

HD will engage with any group or actor provided it can contribute to preventing or ending armed conflict and violence, bringing the organisation’s experience to bear on all areas of dialogue and mediation.

Discretion and responsiveness

As a private entity, HD can react quickly and flexibly to emerging crises or outbreaks of violence, and can take more calculated risks than larger organisations or actors working through formal diplomatic channels.
One of HD’s greatest values lies in its capacity to intervene quietly and discreetly. Its low profile and confidential approach allows it to engage in situations where official actors and those in conventional diplomacy circles may not. These attributes also allow HD to engage on issues that may seem insoluble to others and, most importantly, with actors – such as rebel movements, armed groups and extremist organisations – which are the hardest to reach and remain elusive to many in the peace-making community.

**A solid track record**

Over the last 18 years, HD has established a solid track record – having facilitated almost 40 peace or conflict management agreements across the globe. This reflects the organisation’s broad reach and expanding role, as well as its capacity to adapt to evolving sources of conflict and insecurity.

In all of its undertakings, HD looks for creative options for managing conflict, with a clear focus on the impact of its initiatives. The organisation invests in tailor-made interventions that are measurably effective and which support the establishment of inclusive and lasting peace.

**A decentralized approach**

To remain efficient in a rapidly evolving and evermore complex international landscape, HD has established a decentralized structure. It has five regional hubs covering Africa, Francophone Africa, Asia, Eurasia, as well as the Middle East and North Africa. These hubs each have the agility and capacity to respond rapidly to emerging conflict situations, as well as unique regional networks and knowledge of local contexts. They are supported by a lean headquarters in Switzerland, which provides executive oversight and corporate support.

**Leading on mediation expertise**

HD also plays a leadership role across the mediation sector, promoting discussion on emerging challenges and sharing insights drawn from its own operational experiences.

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The organisation’s peacemaking interventions are supported and strengthened by its Mediation Support and Policy Programme which combines the cross-cutting functions of providing mediation support to the organisation’s projects and others, as well as expertise and support for the organisation’s strategy, monitoring, evaluation and learning.

**Ensuring the inclusiveness of peacemaking initiatives**

Over the past 10 years, HD has worked pragmatically in support of more inclusive peace processes. The organisation builds on its capacity to work with diverse actors and its niche as a private organisation with access to high-level dialogue processes, to ensure the meaningful contribution of women, young people and civil society in peace processes. Their participation can bring significant benefits. It is often through the participation of these groups that innovative ideas and new perspectives emerge and inform the outcome of peacemaking efforts. Fostering inclusion can take many forms depending on the peace process and the political space available for civil society representatives, women and young people to participate.

For more information, please visit www.hdcentre.org or watch a short video clip about the organisation at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i5_63q7l3_g&t=3s

All of HD’s publications are available as free downloads here: https://www.hdcentre.org/library/
David Lambo – A Tireless Humanitarian

Our HD colleague and friend, David Lambo, passed away on the 17th of March 2017 in Nairobi, Kenya. David believed passionately in humanitarianism and peace, and worked tirelessly, and with extraordinary energy, throughout his life to improve the lives of people in conflicts. As a senior professional, David cared deeply about nurturing young people and had extraordinary empathy for all those around him. He was a humanitarian in the truest sense.

David’s career spanned some of the most important events in Africa. He joined the United Nations in 1971, initially working for the UN Economic Commission for Africa in Addis Ababa, then two years later for the UNHCR in a variety of capacities in Geneva and in Africa, including as the organisation’s Representative in Tanzania. In 1975, he joined a small group of pioneers who launched the UN Environmental Programme in Nairobi.

In 1983, his passion for the development of his continent led him to the private sector. He owned and ran an agro business venture for ten years in Nigeria and in Ghana.

In 1992, he returned to the UNHCR, serving first as co-ordinator of one of the largest repatriation operations that the agency had

Photos: David Lambo during the Liberian Presidential Elections in 2011 (left), and at the Closing Ceremony of the Jos Inter-communal Dialogue Process in Plateau State, Nigeria, December 2014 (right). © HD
ever organised with the return of 1.5 million Mozambican refugees to their home country. He later became the UNHCR Regional Liaison Representative for Africa accredited to the Organization of African Unity and to the Government of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia. In 2002, he was appointed Director of UNHCR’s Africa Bureau. He later served as the Agency’s Acting Assistant High Commissioner in charge of Operations before retiring in 2006.

Upon retirement, David did not rest long and joined HD as a Senior Adviser in 2006. He spent more than ten years with HD, founding the organisation’s Africa programme and helping to shepherd its work across the continent. During this time, David was an Adviser to H.E. Kofi Annan during the mediation of the post-election violence in Kenya in 2007 and 2008, and established several mediation processes in Somalia. He also facilitated dialogue in Liberia during the 2011 elections, and established critical dialogue processes in Nigeria’s Middle Belt to help bring an end to more than a decade of conflict in that region.

David believed passionately in humanitarianism and peace, and worked tirelessly, and with extraordinary energy, throughout his life to improve the lives of people in conflicts. . . . He was a humanitarian in the truest sense.

David was a tireless advocate for peace, and a mentor to so many across the continent – young peacemakers and Presidents alike. In the midst of highly stressful mediation processes, he would remind us all to take time for our own families and to take care of ourselves. He will be much missed by his colleagues and friends, but so much of his legacy continues in the important work and peace processes that he built across the region. We, at HD, are committed to continuing his work, and we will all strive to emulate his passion and determination. ●
Conflicts have become more complex and interlinked than ever before,”
Antonio Guterres lamented at the end of 2016 as he started his term as United Nations Secretary-General. The world faced more, and more long-lasting, conflicts, he observed, citing the rise of global terrorism, climate change, population growth, food insecurity and increasing competition for resources.

To this forbidding list he could have added the return of geopolitics in 2016 – signalled by bombers over Syria and warships in the South China Sea – or the trend towards the atomization of conflicts which has made national armies only one player in a complex field which includes a plethora of armed and violent non-state actors. Mr Guterres, however, pinpointed the international community’s biggest weakness as its inability to prevent crises. “The challenges,” he said, “are now surpassing our ability to respond”.

His stark assessment forcefully underscored the pressing need for the international community to bring more resources and creativity to bear on peacemaking and conflict prevention. Against this background, HD continued to expand its operations in 2016, responding to a growing demand for its experience and proven skills in engaging with parties to armed conflict. HD’s activities are built on its extensive networks and track record of connecting with the most difficult-to-reach armed groups who, for legal and security reasons, may fall outside the reach of conventional diplomacy or United Nations’ agencies.

By the end of 2016, HD had more than 40 projects in progress in over 25 countries, working at the heart of the world’s most dangerous conflicts in Africa, the Middle East, Europe as well as East and Central Asia.
Over the past five years, HD has helped to bring about 39 peace and conflict management agreements. One of the most recent of those involved HD playing a very discreet facilitation role during the final stages of the Wadi Barada deal in Syria which put an end to the fierce fighting that had cut water supplies to millions in Greater Damascus. Earlier in 2016, HD helped to negotiate a humanitarian appeal that made possible the safe delivery of humanitarian aid to war-weary civilians in Libya’s battle-scared city of Benghazi; steered communities in Nigeria’s Kaduna State to a commitment to undertake dialogue on local conflicts; and used dialogue to find ways for China and its regional neighbours to avoid a flare up of conflict in the contested South China Sea.

Such high-profile, formal agreements – which are often the product of years of dogged mediation – are only the most conspicuous outcome of HD’s efforts to curb the human costs of conflict. HD continuously saves lives and protects livelihoods through its less visible work which includes confidential engagement with armed groups and governments, setting up dialogue between communities, or working with political parties to ensure peaceful elections. In 2016, outcomes from this work included local agreements reached by networks of community leaders established by HD in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger; keeping open discreet channels of communication in Ukraine which enabled aid and commercial goods to cross conflict lines; and creating local mediation mechanisms that are breaking the cycle of violence in clan feuds in the province of Sulu in the Philippines. In Syria, HD contributed to the inclusion of armed opposition groups in the formal peace process led by the United Nations and their direct participation in the negotiation of nationwide ceasefires as well as local and humanitarian agreements.

Through its Mediation Support and Policy Programme in Geneva, HD also continued to promote the discussion of emerging challenges across the mediation sector and share insights from its own experiences. The organisation co-hosted the 14th Oslo Forum with Norway. The Forum has become the premier international network for those involved in conflict resolution and, in 2016, Secretary of State John Kerry, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, and the European Union’s foreign affairs chief, Federica Mogherini, were among more than 100 participants examining the dynamic of conflicts in Syria, Afghanistan, Libya and Colombia as part of discussions on the theme of ‘Adapting to a new conflict landscape’.

HD’s activities are built on its extensive networks and track record of connecting with the most difficult-to-reach armed groups.

HD also continued to act on its commitment to improve the effectiveness of its mediation work in the highly dynamic, uncertain and sensitive environments in which it operates. The organisation is pioneering an innovative approach to monitoring, evaluating and learning across its projects and across regions. As part of this effort, it conducted 18 peer reviews and 3 external evaluations in 2016, covering a little under half of HD’s project portfolio.

In addition, HD collaborated with a range of peacemaking, humanitarian and research institutions – including the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, International IDEA, swisspeace and the Berghof Foundation – to combine complementary skills, and provided input on request to the European Union for mediation support initiatives. Ideas and experiences from these partnerships and HD’s efforts to support its own operations were shared with a global audience through learning events and thematic publications, including publications on diasporas as catalysts for change and supporting national dialogues.
Middle East and North Africa

As the conflict in Syria moved into its sixth year with no let-up in the carnage, HD continued to work through its contacts among all parties except Islamic State (IS) and Al Qaeda-related groups, probing opportunities to de-escalate the fighting, permit aid deliveries and bring forward discussion of political options that could lead to peace.

It held discussions with Syrian Government officials on all issues, including the possible shape of a political resolution to the conflict, and conveyed the Syrian Government’s answers to questions raised by Western governments.

HD engaged in intensive dialogue with representatives of the main armed opposition groups on the diplomatic and political dimensions of the crisis which resulted in their agreement to participate in the formal UN peace process, promote the cessation of hostilities agreements, as well as deals for humanitarian purposes and aid deliveries. By the end of the year, HD supported the armed opposition groups to co-ordinate with the UN on a humanitarian initiative to evacuate all civilians trapped in besieged neighbourhoods of Aleppo.

In addition, HD convened a series of meetings between representatives of the Kurdish-controlled Autonomous Administration in the north-east of Syria and Western governments, helping to develop plans for inclusive local governance in areas liberated from IS.

Throughout the year, HD advised and liaised with the UN Special Envoy, briefed the United States (US) and European Union (EU) and officials of other Western governments, and provided a backchannel for communication.
with armed opposition groups. As the year progressed, the Syrian Government scored military successes thus becoming more intransigent, escalating pressure on civilians in opposition-controlled areas, closing down deliveries of humanitarian aid, and stalling the UN peace process. Even in this environment of ferocious conflict and political-diplomatic deadlock, HD was able to find openings for assisting civilians.

On behalf of international donors and aid organisations seeking to get aid to Syrian civilians, HD helped set up contacts between them and informal civilian assistance networks in Syria. This resulted in 11 projects in opposition-held areas and two in hard-to-reach areas besieged by the Syrian Government.

HD also helped to arrange aid deliveries by the UN to Daraya which had been besieged by the Syrian Government since 2012.

When requested by all the parties concerned, HD explored possibilities for local ceasefires and supported several other local agreements between the Syrian Government and the Syrian opposition which contributed to relative stability in parts of Syria.

HD also moved forward in Iraq with a new initiative to help stabilize areas liberated from IS. This initiative addresses a challenge at the heart of Iraq’s prospects for achieving security and development. Shia militias fighting IS have meted out reprisals against Sunni populations in liberated areas. Curbing those excesses and reconnecting Sunni communities with the mainly Shia Baghdad Government will be the key to avoiding another generation of bloody sectarian strife inflicting misery long after IS forces are driven out.

HD started identifying Sunnis who could provide leadership in setting out local grievances, formulating measures to address them and engaging with Shia powerbrokers. It arranged a meeting of the mainly Shia militias in Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces in Beirut to discuss their concerns and issues, also bringing in Iraqi Government officials, diplomats and representatives of humanitarian agencies. This led to a request from Sunni community leaders for HD to help connect them with Shia leaders.

“HD explored possibilities for local ceasefires and supported several other local agreements between the Syrian Government and the Syrian opposition which contributed to relative stability in parts of Syria.

A subsequent dialogue convened by HD between Iraqi Government officials and religious, tribal and business leaders from the mainly Sunni Anbar governorate produced both a vision for the governorate’s future and a 10-point proposal which government officials accepted and submitted for consideration to the Prime Minister’s office. This resulted in the Prime Minister’s agreement to reinstate 6,500 police officers who had been fired as well as former Iraqi state officers who had been dismissed. The Prime Minister also agreed to release 500 prisoners who had been detained with no charges, and to consider reforms to the Electoral Commission. In addition, the 10-point proposal contributed to negotiations on the reopening of the border between Iraq and Jordan.

Right after the start of the campaign to drive IS out of Mosul, HD convened a meeting between the main militia groups, as well as tribal and political leaders from the Ninawa region, to start addressing concerns about the post-IS situation in Mosul.

In addition, HD organised a meeting with tribal and security leaders from the Baghdad Belt area and the Iraqi Government on sensitive issues, including the return of local residents displaced by the fight with IS which will need careful handling to ease tensions and stabilize the area.

In Libya, HD navigated the difficult situation caused by the conflict between a myriad of political factions, armed militias and tribes.
Photo: A member of the East Libyan Forces holds his weapon as he stands in front of a destroyed house in Ganfouda district in Benghazi, Libya, January 2017. © Reuters/Esam Omran Al-Fetori
Confidence in the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) brokered by the UN in 2015 eroded in 2016, and non-state armed groups with access to state resources grew stronger.

The parties’ mistrust of international bodies and states, however, allowed HD – as an independent private actor – to play a unique role in building trust with Libyan groups. It engaged proactively with the political actors, armed entities and social groups who opposed or supported the LPA, and built on previous efforts to negotiate ceasefires and humanitarian access in local conflicts, particularly in Benghazi.

HD brought a broad spectrum of influential national leaders together for the first round of an ‘open dialogue for stability’ and consulted high-level military and political leaders in Benghazi on how to involve them in a national-level dialogue. Earlier in the year in March, HD used its contacts with conflict parties and influential figures, including members of Libya’s rival parliaments, to facilitate the adoption of a Humanitarian Appeal for Benghazi which sought an increase in aid to the population battered by conflict and promising to create the conditions for its safe delivery. To follow up on the Appeal, HD convened two rounds of dialogue between representatives from the city and international aid agencies.

The Appeal produced direct results:

- Increased aid for the city,
- The reopening of several Benghazi schools and medical facilities, and
- The training of demining agents.

Benghazi was also designated as a priority area for support by the stabilization facility set up by the UN Development Programme under an agreement reached with the Government of National Accord in Tripoli.

HD also sought to break down barriers to co-operation in other locations. It held a dialogue between women, government security forces and militias to enhance human security in Tripoli, which led female civil society activists to set up a working group which continues to meet almost weekly. A few days after the end of military operations targeting IS elements in
Sirte, HD convened a meeting between elected officials from the city on restoring local governance. It also organised a meeting between representatives of Zintan and the international community to strengthen and build on the humanitarian and stabilization efforts conducted in the city and its surroundings. This meeting led to an official written statement from the Military Council of Zintan against military escalation in western Libya and prompted it to reopen an oil pipeline shut down two years earlier, bringing back a potential production capacity of close to half a million barrels a day.

The ability of the international community to exploit these openings and provide the conditions needed for restoring peace to Libya is critical to maintaining stability in neighbouring Tunisia, where the transition to democracy has faced terrorist strikes and the social stress created by a weakened economy. Tunisia’s efforts to deal with the threat from Libya’s turmoil have been hampered by an often dysfunctional relationship with Libyan authorities.

In 2016, HD conducted a mission to the border to consult security and political actors on both sides, and opened channels of communication between them. This eventually helped the parties to reach an agreement to reduce tensions in the border region in early 2017. HD built up high-level links with political and institutional leaders in Tunisia during its work on the Charter of Honour for the 2014 elections and was called in to help mediate a number of issues arising in 2016. In partnership with a Tunisian association Al-Mugadimma, HD initiated a dialogue with political and institutional actors on framing a shared vision for national security.
Africa

Drawing on the experience and unrivalled network of contacts HD has acquired in Africa, the organisation set out to monitor emerging tensions in 10 countries (Angola, Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo [DRC], Kenya, northeast Nigeria, Niger, Mali, Uganda and Zimbabwe) in 2016 to see where mediation could prevent instability from progressing into full-blown crisis, and where HD was in a position to help develop remedies. It received support from Humanity United and co-operated closely with the African Union (AU) for this exercise. In late 2016, it signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the AU which will deepen the partnership between the two organisations in 2017.

In the DRC and Zimbabwe, which have both entered a period of political transition with the potential for serious violence, HD started discussions on initiatives that could help to lower tensions. In the DRC, it focused on dialogue to prepare the ground for a peaceful transition until the elections while, in Zimbabwe, it supported key stakeholders to begin an inter-generational dialogue as a vehicle for approaching the country’s core concerns.

This new focus on conflict prevention accompanied deepening engagement across the continent which aimed to tackle deeply-rooted sources of tension and conflict. Since 2013, HD has fostered inter-communal dialogue in Nigeria’s Plateau State and, in March 2016, it embarked on a similar process in neighbouring Kaduna State, one of the most conflict-affected areas of Nigeria. The project led to the conclusion of the Kafanchan Peace Declaration in which 29 ethnic communities committed themselves to tackling decades-old ethno-religious disputes through dialogue. Confidence

Photo: The unveiling of a public community apology billboard in southern Kaduna State. This billboard was set up as part of the inter-communal dialogue process led by HD in Kaduna State, November 2016. © HD
between the communities grew rapidly as a result of regular dialogue examining sources of tension and the work of Tension Management Networks monitoring security. The benefits were soon apparent in a significant drop in incidents of conflict.

While in many countries HD’s work remains discreetly unobserved and confidential, in Nigeria it has gained public recognition, exemplified by President Buhari’s comments on the decline of violence in Plateau State and his congratulations to HD for its efforts.

HD’s work in Plateau State and Kaduna State has received strong support from authorities at both state and federal levels. While in many countries HD’s work remains discreetly unobserved and confidential, in Nigeria it has gained public recognition, exemplified by President Buhari’s comments on the decline of violence in Plateau State and his congratulations to HD for its efforts. The solid relationships and experience HD has built up in Nigeria have allowed it to begin new work in 2016 in the conflict-wracked and devastated north-eastern Borno State.

The Nigerian military regained control of some north-eastern areas from Boko Haram permitting a resumption of humanitarian operations, but the area still faces a constant threat of attacks. This underscores the acute need for initiatives to stabilize communities and create space for tackling the poverty and social ills that led some to join the insurgency. HD has started a process of building dialogue among the groups most affected by the conflict in the north-east, developing contacts between Muslim and Christian leaders, village heads and traditional leaders with the aim of establishing trust and creating the conditions for reconciliation between communities.

The project in Borno State was only one of a widening portfolio of activities which put HD at the heart of the major threats to security in West Africa. Against a background of more than 230 violent incidents or attacks by jihadist groups in Mali in 2016, HD continued to support the peace process set out by the 2015 Algiers’ Agreement, including supporting the parties in disseminating the Agreement’s content to communities, combatants and opinion leaders. In an increasingly challenging environment, HD facilitated meetings between representatives of the parties to help develop a joint vision for an effective implementation process for the Agreement. In 2016, HD also endeavoured to address the issues which are critical to the conflict’s dynamics. The organisation launched a dialogue process among Muslim leaders at the community level to foster peace and ease tensions among the various branches of Sunna. Notwithstanding deteriorating security conditions in the northern part of the country, HD also helped resolve two inter-communal conflicts enabling the return of displaced civilians to their homes.

Mali accounted for the great majority of violent incidents in the Sahel in 2016 but, in an area of weak central government and highly porous borders, the security threats in Mali have a regional impact. Neighbouring Niger and Burkina Faso also experienced an increasing number of jihadist acts such as attacks on border posts and kidnappings. In this context, HD continued to build up local community networks in the border areas between the three countries, and continued to strengthen their ability to prevent and manage potential conflicts in pastoral areas. These efforts had immediate, positive results. HD set up three additional networks in 2016 involving 106 influential local leaders, bringing the total number of networks to 9 and involving close to 300 community leaders.

The networks helped resolve almost 70 conflicts between farmers and pastoralists in 2016. This resulted in a marked decline in local conflicts related to access to natural resources in the region, a restoration of trust
between communities which had been highly weakened following the Malian conflict in 2012, and the return of 1,767 stolen animals to their owners thanks to the direct lines of communication between communities. It also resulted in an increase in the sharing of information about transhumance between community leaders across neighbouring countries in order to prevent the eruption of new conflicts.

HD also brought officials from the three states together and involved women’s associations and youth groups in the dialogue taking place between, and within, the community networks.

A particular success in 2016 was the signing of an agreement between the semi-nomadic Fulani cattle herders of Niger and the Dawsahak of Mali, ending a 30-year conflict over pastoral resources in the cross-border area between the two countries which had fuelled the conflict at the national level in Mali.

Following up on groundbreaking research in 2015 on perceptions of what drives radicalization in the border areas of eight countries in the Sahel, HD delivered presentations on the findings in several cities including Bamako, Addis Ababa, Geneva, Paris and Moscow. These presentations contributed to increasing awareness among the international community of non-coercive ways to tackle the rise of radicalization in the region.

Photo: A soldier from the Tuareg rebel group MNLA in the northeastern town of Kidal, Mali. The MNLA is part of the CMA (Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad) which signed the 2015 Algier’s Agreement with the Government of Mali. © Reuters/Cheick Diouara
Clashes between armed groups also contributed to violence and insecurity in the Central African Republic, which remains overshadowed by the threat of sectarian violence and is still dependent on UN peacekeepers for its security. The conclusions of the Bangui Forum, held in 2015 with the support of HD and other international actors, contributed to peaceful presidential elections in February 2016. HD continued to support the fragile new central government directly by providing advice to the national authorities, training staff, helping to set up provincial peace and reconciliation committees, and convening a number of community dialogue processes which significantly eased local tensions, including those between nomad and sedentary communities. HD also helped the government start its disarmament, demobilisation, reinsertion and repatriation (DDRR) programme for armed groups and emphasised the need to integrate it into the national transitional justice process. Although the three biggest militias remained outside the process, HD played a pivotal role in providing a channel for dialogue for all armed groups and ensuring that their grievances were addressed within the DDRR process.

In Senegal, HD continued to support the peace process which aims to end the conflict between the Government and armed rebel groups. HD has provided advice on possible negotiating strategies to the Government and the three factions in the Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques pour la Casamance (MFDC), but progress in these discussions stalled in 2016 as the groups prioritised an internal reconciliation process over dialogue with the Government. HD consequently engaged the diaspora and civil society groups, including women, in workshops on ways they can encourage the conflict parties to move towards reconciliation. It also supported national entities assisting the reintegration of combatants into civilian life.

Across the continent, South Sudan presented one of the bleakest prospects for peacemaking in Africa as spiralling violence drove millions from their homes and devastated an already impoverished economy. HD focused on neighbouring countries and on fostering regional support for peace. To inform the development of peacemaking options, the organisation undertook a study of perceptions among South Sudan’s internally displaced people of repatriation and protection issues. It also facilitated dialogue among experts and humanitarian organisations on possible peacemaking strategies, and brought South Sudanese civil society representatives together in Nairobi, which led to the setting up of a new network of peacemakers.

In Somalia, HD has been supporting dialogue between Somaliland and the Federal Government of Somalia, including assisting a parallel process which brings opinion leaders from Somaliland and Somalia together to build common understanding of a possible solution to the political conflict. HD also provided tech-
technical support to Somalia’s National Leadership Forum, setting up meetings between officials on national issues and giving advice on the electoral model for the 2016 federal elections. In addition, HD was active in supporting dialogue around local conflicts in the country, particularly around Galkayo which is emerging as another hotspot of tensions as the regional member states develop.

The past year also saw HD stepping up its activities in the Great Lakes region. It assisted regional efforts to defuse the political crisis that erupted in Burundi after President Pierre Nkurunziza’s 2015 decision to extend his stay in office beyond the constitutional limit. Amid warnings by the UN that the Government’s actions risked igniting genocide and destabilizing a region scarred by the Rwandan genocide of the 1990s, HD supported the mediation efforts of the East African Community (EAC). It attended the two rounds of negotiations in Arusha, Tanzania, as an official observer, and held bilateral meetings with the Government and CNARED, the main opposition coalition. Its work with the CNARED focused on defining the Coalition’s goals and approaches to negotiations, and helped shape its decision to take part in the EAC negotiations.

HD also organised workshops with civil society actors to help refine their positions towards, and engagement in, the mediation process. In addition, HD facilitated a meeting between Uganda’s President Museveni, in his capacity as EAC mediator, and three former Burundian Presidents, to discuss possible approaches to tackling the crisis.

Photo: Protesters during demonstrations against the ruling party’s decision to allow President Pierre Nkurunziza to run for a third term in office, Bujumbura, Burundi, April 2015. © Reuters/Thomas Mukoya
Eurasia

HD worked at national, regional and, increasingly, at geopolitical levels in Eurasia to address the multi-layered challenges which stalled the implementation of the peace process in Ukraine and which emerged in increasingly fragile Central Asia.

The frozen state of Ukraine’s conflict underscored the need for the contacts HD is facilitating between the different parties. These have helped all parties in Ukraine, and outside, to identify and exchange ideas for resolving the conflict.

Deepening polarization between Europe and Russia eroded any international impetus to put the Minsk peace agreements into effect in Ukraine. In that chilly environment, the Government in Kyiv and the groups controlling the Donbass region failed to reach any compromise, leaving civilians exposed to flare-ups in conflict along the line of contact separating the combatants.

Paradoxically, the frozen state of Ukraine’s conflict underscored the need for the contacts HD is facilitating between the different parties. These have helped all parties in Ukraine, and outside, to identify and exchange ideas for resolving the conflict, and to explore areas of co-operation which keep alive societal links and working relationships across the lines of conflict in the east of Ukraine, as well as prevent economic and ecological crises.

HD arranged consultations between international experts and the conflict parties, and provided expert analysis to help the parties look at possible solutions as part of the Minsk process. On the ground, the conflict parties conducted economic studies on the costs of the conflict and government policy towards the Donbass region which had a positive influence on decisions in Kyiv to allow more movement of goods across the line of conflict.

Discussions and contacts facilitated by HD between the parties on ecological issues led both sides to assess major environmental hazards posed by abandoned mines and damaged chemical and nuclear waste storage facilities in the conflict zone. These assessments raised awareness of the potential for a major environmental disaster and preparations for action to avert it.
At the geopolitical level, HD provided a channel for contacts between interlocutors from Europe, Kyiv and Moscow to identify creative ways to reduce tensions.

Meanwhile, HD saw its efforts to foster support for conflict prevention among Central Asian states continue to gain momentum. Experts and decision-makers from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan involved in discussions on regional security issues demonstrated greater confidence in the process by probing issues previously considered taboo and off-limits. Participants identified radicalization and the need to strengthen peaceful political management as the priorities for their deliberations.

Members of the group attended a meeting that was convened by HD in Istanbul, producing research papers on a range of issues and displaying significantly more openness than during previous discussion rounds. HD arranged access to international experts and provided advice to members of the group. Those members also actively sought HD’s advice and collaboration on planning further discussions.
Asia

HD’s particular focus in Asia in 2016 was on the South China Sea and creating a platform for contacts with regional states to avert the growing danger of conflict over their competing claims in the resource-rich area. Tensions spiked after the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled against China’s claim to sovereignty over the area in July, which made the dialogue facilitated by HD all the more challenging and urgent.

Over the course of the year, HD organised three experts’ meetings, a training and simulation exercise attended by policy-makers as well as naval and coastguard experts from Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and China. These meetings generated consensus on the need for a set of common operating principles which would standardise responses to incidents at sea and prevent them from blowing up into violent confrontations. By the end of the year, HD was able to convene the first meeting of coastguard authorities from China and the other three countries during which they agreed to set up a China Sea Maritime Law Enforcement Forum to draw up the operating principles and to serve as a platform for co-operation between the maritime authorities of all four countries.

As Myanmar transitioned uneasily from military rule to a civilian-led government, HD supported efforts to achieve a ceasefire which could end the decades-old armed struggle by ethnic minorities which the new administration of Aung San Suu Kyi has identified as a priority. HD engaged intensively with all parties, providing training on ceasefire monitoring, security sector reform, as well as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The training HD provided has increased the capacity of the parties to implement the ceasefire and equipped them with a common set of concepts on which to negotiate.

Photo: Chinese vessels in the waters in the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, May 2015. © Reuters/File photo
HD also worked to promote strategies to curb the escalating violence in the mainly Muslim areas of Myanmar’s Rakhine State which borders Bangladesh. The organisation held a series of briefings, and undertook discreet policy advocacy, with the incoming Union Government and the Kofi Annan-led Advisory Commission. It also conducted a series of field assessments in Rakhine State to identify confidence-building measures. HD consulted civil society groups and advised on strategies for their engagement with the central government, establishing a reputation as an independent actor.

After supporting efforts to secure a peace agreement between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), in 2016 HD was active in assisting with its implementation. This involved advising the Government and MILF peace panels and keeping up high-level contacts between the parties, the Malaysian facilitator and the International Contact Group. HD arranged dialogue with minorities as well as women’s and youth groups to provide broad-based support for the process, and worked on developing the mediation skills of stakeholders at the community level. It provided similar mediation training to community leaders and youth volunteers in Sulu where the organisation has a long-standing relationship with local mediators. In 2016, there were positive results from these efforts.

Despite increasing tensions linked to the Philippines’ presidential election, the project brought about a settlement or ceasefires in 17 clan conflicts in the course of the year. These, in turn, led to improvements in people’s daily lives with the reopening of schools and the development of infrastructures such as roads and electricity. In addition, interactions with local communities through the project have positively influenced their mindsets on how to settle clan disputes and built their capacity to settle those peacefully.
War is Back

From the end of the Cold War until 2010, war seemed to be going away. Interstate warfare disappeared almost completely for a while. Civil wars continued, but at an ever-lower level, and came to be seen less as an existential threat than as a policy challenge to which regular instruments of public policy could be applied. A consensus emerged as to how those public policy instruments should be used, with the elimination—or near-elimination—of armed conflict as the goal.

Since 2010, however, this has unravelled. War is back. Armed conflict has been increasing steadily: the number of wars; the number of battle deaths; the number of terrorist incidents; the number of people displaced by violence. Almost everything to do with war that can be reliably counted has been getting worse. Not yet catastrophically so, but to a degree and at a pace that has so far defied efforts to staunch it.

The Post-Cold War Policy Consensus

From the end of World War II to the end of the Cold War, the annual worldwide total for battle deaths seldom fell below 100,000, with major spikes of violence taking the totals to above 200,000 for extended periods. And then, it largely stopped. The first few years after the Cold War produced localized spasms of violence—in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda—but the global trend was dramatically downward. With the end of the Cold War, the world became much more peaceful (see Figure 1).
Conflicts are evolving, but the tools for containing or resolving those conflicts have not evolved as fast. These tools, therefore, need to be re-shaped.

A policy consensus emerged on how to deal with the “conflict-poverty trap.” Three elements were held to be essential, and to benefit from external support: physical security, economic growth, and time. If these elements were present—as in Guatemala, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Timor Leste, and others—a country might gradually escape the trap. If they were not present—as in Afghanistan, Congo, or South Sudan—escape would not be possible.

Each of the elements needed to escape the conflict-poverty trap spawned an international
machinery. International mediators, many of whom became major public personalities, helped “the warring parties” reach peace accords. The age of absolute victory by one side or another seemed to be at an end. These accords were then often supported by growing numbers of peacekeeping troops, usually from the United Nations, but later also from the African Union, the European Union, and elsewhere. The World Bank and others sought new ways to program funds in countries emerging from conflict.

And the policy consensus seemed to be producing results. The second half of the 1990s was, by many measures, the least violent period in human history. In much of the Western world, perceptions of the decade beginning in 2000 were shaped by the 9/11 attacks on the United States and by the “global war on terror,” including the U.S.-led military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In fact, however, these tragedies obscured the larger and more positive trends in global conflict. Both before and after the 9/11 attacks, most of those who were killed in war were not killed in conflicts connected to 9/11 and the subsequent response. Rather, they were killed in a large number of conflicts in poor countries—mainly in Africa, and mainly unnoticed by the Western media. And in these twilight zones of forgotten conflict, a formula for escaping the death spiral seemed to have been found. All the major trends in violence were downward, as extensively documented in Steven Pinker’s iconic study The Better Angels of Our Nature (2011). This was true of large- and small-scale conflict, of long- and short-term conflict, even when factoring in 9/11 and its aftermath.

Having plotted war’s co-variance with extreme poverty, and having identified the measures needed to address both war and poverty—and having partly aligned those international interventions to conform to those measures—the Western policy establishment

The challenge of preventing and resolving armed conflict was seen by some as comparable to the challenge of eradicating global polio or to that of eliminating commercial aircraft crashes.

Figure 2 Poverty and war risk

Source: Macartan Humphreys and Ashutosh Varshney, based on Collier and Hoeffler 2002
was optimistic. The challenge of preventing and resolving armed conflict was seen by some as comparable to the challenge of eradicating global polio or to that of eliminating commercial aircraft crashes. The goal of ending war—or of nudging it asymptotically close to zero—seemed to many to be within reach. The war against war was being won.

**The End of the End of History**

In his Preface to the Philosophy of Right (1820), Hegel observed that “the owl of Minerva flies only at dusk”—that we are wise about events only as those events are ending. The post-Cold War consensus on the management of armed conflict was captured in a series of important publications in 2010 and 2011. The data was showing—with greater clarity than ever before—not just how fast armed conflict was declining, but also the positive impact of efforts to break the conflict-poverty trap. Based on this data, the policy prescriptions for dealing with the residual caseload of armed conflict were refined.

But the owl had already flown. Just as this body of literature was emerging, the trends began to go into reverse—slowly at first, and then faster in the years that followed. The first four cases to buck the trend were in the Middle East: Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and, above all, Syria. By 2014, for the first time since the end of the Cold War, global annual battle deaths had again topped 100,000. In the same year, the global total of refugees and internally displaced persons topped 50 million, a number not seen since the epic population movements at the close of World War II and during the civil war in China.

A new wave of literature emerged, focusing on the “Arab Spring,” on the particular pathologies of the Arab autocracies and the “youth bulge” in those countries, and on the unmet expectations and unrespected rights of those youthful populations. But the owl was flying again. Mali, which is not an Arab country, imploded in 2012, partly as a knock-on effect of the war in Libya, with the north of the country being lost to armed Islamist groups. The Central African Republic, which is even less Arab than Mali, drifted perilously close to a genocide in 2013, as did South Sudan. Ukraine fell into conflict in 2014, as did Iraq after several years of much lower levels of violence. Yemen, too, erupted into open warfare in 2014.

By 2015, most of the gains in the 25-year “war against war” had been lost. The number of wars and the number of people killed were back to Cold War levels.

During the same period—and partly linked to the same phenomena—terrorism reached levels never before seen. The number of attacks, and the number of casualties, almost tripled between 2010 and early 2016. Belgium, France, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Nigeria, Thailand, and Turkey all saw unprecedented levels of terrorist violence. While not threatening the viability of any of these states, terrorism—including in its trans-national aspects—became a global challenge.

By 2015, most of the gains in the 25-year “war against war” had been lost. The number of wars and the number of people killed were back to Cold War levels. The number of terrorist attacks and the number of refugees had surpassed the worst of the Cold War. Military interventions that had been launched with the stated aim of ending specific threats of violence—Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya—had not only failed to achieve their goals, but had lingered, spread, and facilitated the emergence of new conflicts (see Figure 3).

This backsliding was not for want of trying. The United States spent an estimated $3 trillion in an effort to stabilize Afghanistan and Iraq. The UN Security Council entered into almost permanent session, adopting, among many others, the resolution that was used as the basis for the Western-led military intervention in Libya. The UN deployed more “Special
Envoy’s mediators than ever before, even bringing back former Secretary-General Kofi Annan to mediate on Syria. The number of UN Blue Helmets rose steadily, from 20,000 in 2000 to over 100,000 in 2015.

Weakness of Tools to Prevent and Resolve Armed Conflict

There have only ever been a limited number of tools for preventing or resolving armed conflict. Across history, six major instruments have dominated these efforts.

- **Norms**: Despite claims to the contrary from the ill-named “realist” school of international relations, there is ample evidence that norms have significantly constrained the use of violence in the international system. Norms have, for example, contributed to a steady decline in the number of interstate invasions.
- **Information**: The use of information—both real and invented—has been an essential element in starting wars, preventing them, and stopping them.
- **Deterrence**: The likelihood of a party going to war is reduced by the reasonable expectation that force can be deployed to prevent that party from attaining its goals.
- **Force**: When deterrence fails, the use of force is the normal means by which an act of armed aggression is ended.
- **Economy**: Tribute, trade, sanctions, and, more recently, economic development assistance, have all been used to encourage nations on the path to peace, and to otherwise shape their behaviour.
- **Diplomacy**: Negotiation and mediation have been the means by which alternatives to armed conflict have been sought.

Weakened Tools

The fundamentals of these tools do not change much. What changes most is the extent to which they are adapted to a particular context. The peculiarity of our own age is that all six of the tools have been honed with the state remaining the basic unit of reference. Armed conflict, however, has been evolving in precisely the opposite direction, partly due to the way technology has evolved.

Below the state level, social media technology has enabled large, leaderless groups of
people to express their grievances as never before, and even to remove repressive regimes, as in Tunisia, Egypt, and Ukraine. At the trans-boundary level, the internet abets the radicalization and recruitment of terrorists from one country for action in other. Web technology also enhances the trans-boundary trafficking that underpins many of the world’s armed conflicts. Supra-national conflict, such as resurgent Sunni-Shia conflict, is likewise enhanced by “new media.”

Technology is not the only reason for the feeble impact of traditional tools for managing conflict in our time. Without attempting to enumerate all the new and emerging drivers of armed conflict in our world, it is still possible to identify some of the factors that have diminished these tools.

The framework of “universal norms,” for example, is now subject to robust challenge, and is presented by challengers as a framework of “Western norms”. Geopolitics is back on the international scene, after a hiatus of some 20 years, and political ideas are one of the battlegrounds.

Exacerbating this, Western countries have been distinctly less-than-attentive to norms such as non-interference in the internal affairs of states, and to respect for the territorial integrity of states. If this laxity has not actually weakened the international security architecture, it has, in the context of renewed geopolitical competition, provided a convenient rationale for Russia’s interventions in Ukraine and elsewhere.

The role of information—and misinformation and disinformation—in shaping the perception of key constituencies has never been stronger, and the balance has tipped away from the world’s status quo powers. The Great Firewall of China, Russian troll factories, and the gory spectacles of ISIS’s al-Furqān media production all shape perceptions about issues of war and peace, and the traditional Western state actors have so far produced no effective answer.

Nor are military deterrence and the use of force as effective as in earlier contexts. No effective deterrent to terrorist action in an open society has yet been found. And with American-led military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya widely perceived as both expensive and unsuccessful, the use of expeditionary military operations as a tool for maintaining peace and stability in the international system has declined—at least for the time being. The reluctance of the United States to intervene in Syria reflects, in part, dissatisfaction with the results of previous interventions.

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The UN’s peacekeeping efforts have also run into trouble, for some of the same reasons. The original peacekeepers of the late-1940s and 1950s were neutral observers positioned between the front lines of regular armies. As conflicts became steadily more complex, so too did the operations themselves, thus culminating in “robust peacekeeping operations” that had elements of counter-insurgency or “spoiler management.” The latest such operation, in Mali, has already taken a large number of casualties from Islamist terrorist operations, and the viability of the UN model is being questioned, including in the UN itself.

Efforts to shape the international security system through economic measures do work. The emergence of robust market democracies in East and Southeast Asia correlates very strongly with peace. American efforts to hasten the collapse of the Soviet economy by forcing it to over-invest in armaments were effective. Economic sanctions can also work. The agreements signed between Iran and the P5+1 group of nations explicitly links constraints on the development of Iran’s nuclear program with the easing of economic sanctions.
These measures work, but not fast. At least until updated to reflect the speed of the modern economy, their efficacy in the face of short-term security challenges will remain limited.

The tools for managing armed conflict remain overwhelmingly dominated by states; and they are failing.

Which leaves diplomacy, including mediation. Those who dislike its transactional nature enjoy referring to diplomacy as “the world's second-oldest profession”. It is indeed an old profession — there is not a lot that modern diplomats could teach the Warring States’ emissaries of Sima Qian’s Histories, while Krishna’s epic mediation in the Mahabharata has never been surpassed. But the failure of contemporary diplomacy to provide a framework for preventing and managing armed conflict — and its failure to manage a slew of violent crises — is not a failure of its distant past.

Current diplomacy around violent conflict is a prisoner of its recent past — it is excessively wedded to the interactions between states at a time when fewer and fewer conflicts can be resolved exclusively within that matrix. This weakness is exemplified by the UN Security Council, whose deliberations exclude almost entirely non-state, private sector, and civil society actors that are essential for any effective response to armed conflict.

Adaptation of Existing Tools

What to do? The natural policy choice would be to do nothing. Little attention is paid to the rise of armed violence as a general phenomenon, requiring systemic responses. Security threats are mostly considered within their immediate political context. Terrorist attacks by adherents of ISIS in France or Belgium are routinely considered within the framework of the crisis in Iraq and Syria. Russian intervention in Ukraine is considered within the framework of Russia’s efforts to re-establish a sphere of influence, or to re-establish itself as a major world power. Tensions in the South China Sea are considered within the framework of China’s efforts to establish security domination in its region.

Some consideration is given to the policy responses needed to what might be termed “mid-range” security challenges: “the Arab Spring,” “hybrid warfare,” or counter-terrorism in the context of the recruitment of citizens of EU states for terrorist attacks in the EU itself. These lead to limited adjustments to security budgets and security posture, and even to some adjustments to social and economic policies. Policies for “countering violent extremism” or “preventing violent extremism” are examples of policy responses to these mid-range threats. So far, however, these measures have not reflected a general willingness to engage with the broader issues of preventing and resolving armed conflict.

A broader effort to improve global capacity to manage security threats would start with a recognition that, irrespective of the specific political factors at play in each crisis, the traditional tools for the management of armed conflict are now poorly aligned with the threats. The tools must be adapted to contexts in which states are only one of a number of actors.

Some movement in this direction is perceptible. The mediation of armed conflict, for example, has evolved to accommodate actors other than states. As early as 1994, the Community of Sant’Egidio mediated the peace agreement ending the civil war in Mozambique. The Geneva-based Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, of which I am Executive Director, mediated the first Cessation of Hostilities between the Government of Indonesia and rebels of the Free Aceh Movement. The former President of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari, was able to take this one step further with the 2005 Memorandum of Understanding that ended that war.

Private mediation actors have also developed a capacity for “multi-stakeholder” and “multi-level” processes. In Tunisia, for example, local
and international actors were able to broker a series of agreements between Islamist and secular political forces that helped keep Tunisia stable following the 2011 ouster of long-time dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. The Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet won the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize for its role in this effort, and Tunisia remains the only “Arab Spring” country to have undergone a successful transition—though that stability is being challenged by instability in neighboring Libya and other factors.

Nor is it just the field of diplomacy and mediation that is slowly adapting to the less state-centric world of modern conflict. ISIS leads the way in the effective use of information to shape the battlefield, and the most effective responses now also come from non-state actors—albeit of a very different kind. As Kenya tipped towards civil war in 2008, it was civil society’s Ushahidi crowd-sourced information that was able to provide the most effective real-time counter-mobilization.
But these are exceptions, and they are still relatively minor. The tools for managing armed conflict remain overwhelmingly dominated by states; and they are failing. State-based norms on the use of force gain little traction with individuals and non-state actors at a time when power continues to move from the former to the latter. Business is now a major actor in many of the world’s most conflict-prone arenas, but plays only a very limited direct role in the prevention and resolution of armed conflict. Illegitimate business interests are actively sustaining conflict, but the countervailing efforts of “corporate social responsibility” are marginal.

Armed conflict is surging, and is now largely unconstrained by the traditional state system. Efforts to contain this new generation of warfare will, likewise, need to reach beyond the traditional repertoire of statecraft. Many of the next generation of tools are already available, and have been tested. What is so far lacking is the political will to deploy them systematically and at the required scale.
The Board

HD is supervised by a Board which is the supreme authority of the Foundation. The Board meets twice a year and has set up three committees: an Audit & Finance Committee, which reviews the financial management of the organisation; an Operations Committee, which is responsible for reviewing HD’s programme of work; and a Nominations Committee, in charge of identifying suitable candidates for membership. Each member sits on the Board on a voluntary and private basis.

In June 2016, Ambassador Pierre Vimont and Mr Espen Barth Eide were elected Chair and Vice-Chair of HD’s Board respectively.

Current Board Members

- Ambassador Pierre Vimont
  Chair of the Board
- Mr Espen Barth Eide
  Vice-Chair of the Board and Chair of the Operations Committee
- Mr Jermyn Brooks
  Chair of the Audit & Finance Committee
- Mr Neil Janin
  Chair of the Nominations Committee
- Ms Sarah F. Cliffe
- Mr Jean-Marie Guéhenno
- Ms Ameerah Haq
- Dr Jakob Kellenberger
- Ms Irene Khan
- Ambassador Raymond Loretan
- Dr ‘Funmi Olonisakin
- Dr Surin Pitsuwan
- Ambassador Herman Schaper
- Mr Olivier Steimer

HD is also honoured to have Dr Javier Solana as its Honorary President.
The flexibility offered by institutional funding contributes to HD’s effectiveness by ensuring it has the resources to respond quickly and in an agile way to any given crisis or conflict, enabling it to maintain a critical degree of flexibility in the planning and implementation of its work.

A vast majority of HD’s earmarked funding is tied to its initiatives in the five regions where the organisation is active. In 2016, HD’s regional activities in the Francophonie (Francophone Africa) represented the largest proportion of spending. This is reflective of the organisation’s expanding engagement in the region with ongoing operations in Burundi, the Central African Republic, Mali, Senegal, as well as extensive activities in the Sahel region.

HD is also grateful to the City of Geneva for having provided the organisation with the use of the Villa Plantamour as its headquarters, as an in-kind contribution to its activities over the last 17 years. The Villa is strategically located at the heart of ‘International Geneva’, close to many other international organisations and diplomatic Missions. The Villa also provides HD with an exceptional working environment, ideally suited for discreet dialogue and mediation consultations with conflict stakeholders, or brainstorming sessions with donors, policymakers and peers in the peacemaking sector.