Haile Menkerios on engaging with the powerful

Haile Menkerios 00:00 We don't fight with our friends, we fight with our enemies. And if you are to come to a peaceful resolution of a conflict, you can't do it without including them without talking to them. Sometimes you make those choices. You have to make those choices. Adam Cooper 00:32 From the Oslo Forum, welcome to the Mediator's Studio, a podcast about peacemakers bringing you stories from behind the scenes. I'm your host, Adam Cooper. With me today is Haile Menkerios, a veteran diplomat who transitioned from armed group member, to ambassador, and then to mediator. Throughout his long career with the UN, he contributed to peacemaking efforts across Africa. From Sudan and South Sudan to Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. He knows the continent, and over the years, has met many of those who've shaped it, for better or for worse. From Kofi Annan and Thabo Mbeki to Robert Mugabe and Omar al-Bashir. Haile Menkerios, welcome to the Mediator's Studio. Haile Menkerios 01:16 Thank you. Adam Cooper 01:17 You are the son of an Eritrean farmer, the last of nine children, and you won a scholarship to study in the US. And you're at Harvard in the 1970s, working on your PhD. And at the same time, Eritrea is intensifying its struggle to become independent from Ethiopia. And you decide to leave the US and return home and join the fight. Take me back to that moment. Why did you make this life changing decision? Haile Menkerios 01:45 Of course, I wanted to get the best education I can get in order to improve the condition of my family. But then, you finish your education, you grow up, and always had a dream to go back home, to be with my family. But there was no home to go back to. Eritrea was at war with Ethiopia when I was a student. If I wanted to go home, I had to contribute to making that home. There was already a liberation movement fighting for liberation from Ethiopia. So, I decided to join the struggle. And well, it took almost 20 years actually. Adam Cooper 02:26 And was it not a daunting prospect as a student, you know, untrained in combat, to return and to participate in that struggle? Haile Menkerios 02:36 I think what makes it much easier is that you're not alone. The majority of those who were in the struggle were your friends. Friends that you went to school with and they're there. And therefore, it is a familiar community that is fighting. And if they can do it, why not me? Both in terms of commitment and in terms of bearing the hardship. Adam Cooper 02:57 For a listener who might not be familiar with what the terrain in Eritrea looks like and what that struggle means on a day to day, can you give them a sense of what it was like to be a freedom fighter at that time? Haile Menkerios 03:10 Well, it was the harshness of the life, of course, is there, you know. You've got to all of a sudden carry, you know, almost 30 kilos of ammunition, your water, your gun, and it's an average of 30 kilos actually on your back you have to carry. And constantly on the move so that you're not detected by the enemy. Adam Cooper 03:31 And it was a 20-year struggle, as you said. And fortunately, you made it through and eventually Eritrea found its independence. But there was also, I understand it, quite some loss of many of those around you that you served with. And I can imagine that must have been a difficult thing to see as someone who was responsible for some of the troops around you. Haile Menkerios 03:54 Yes. Yes. When I joined, I joined a unit, a squad, of 18 young people. And I think after a year there were only two of us remaining. And the rest had died. And therefore, you knew your time is coming also. It's not about going, about dying. It's about how you die, what you would have accomplished or seen accomplished before you die. That's what the key issue was, rather than whether you die or not. You know, at that rate, you will follow them as well. That was the norm, you know. When you think of it independently, during safety, in a safe situation, you would be concerned. You would be afraid actually. I don't want to die. When it is the norm, everybody is facing it, it's not as hard to accept. Adam Cooper 04:48 And that normalisation of suffering, if you will, or learning how to live with it. I assume that that creates a trauma, which is a burden that stays with you. But is it also something that you try to draw on constructively, almost, for your work as a mediator? Haile Menkerios 05:08 Well, yes. The work as a mediator afterwards, you're not in a war situation now. So, you are ready to appreciate, to understand the hardships not only just you as a person, but the whole society goes through. What was paid, the death, the destruction. That is the consequence of a war, of a long drawn war. You begin to think: I wouldn't want others to go through that. And there are times when now you calculate, was it all worth it? I think I still would have done it, but I would have thought now, I would have calculated the cost also. We did not calculate the cost at that time. We only saw about what our objective was and meeting our objective at any cost. Adam Cooper 06:11 I want to talk a little bit later, Haile, about your mediation experiences and maybe how you've tried to convince some of the leaders that you've dealt with of that cost of war. But I also want to talk about your transformation from a fighter to a diplomat. Because you served in the Information Department of Eritrean People's Liberation Front, the EPLF, as you mentioned, the Political Department, and then you became the governor of a liberated area. And after independence, you're the first Eritrean ambassador to Ethiopia. What was it like as a former combatant arriving in the capital of the country you've been fighting against? Take me to that moment in your first meetings with Ethiopian officials. Haile Menkerios 06:53 I was lucky. It was easy for me because the people who were in government in Ethiopia were the people I knew, were fighters like me. Many times, it was almost both of us sort of thinking what would be in the best interest of both countries because we had fought with that objective side by side, if not always together. These were fighters just yesterday. They were fighters, actually with me. In fact, we won the war at the same time, because it was the same enemy. We were fighting the same enemy. So, it was an easier transition for me. Adam Cooper 07:32 Later on, you were sent to the UN in New York as ambassador, but found yourself at odds with the policies of your own President, and as a result, had a very consequential falling out. What happened? Haile Menkerios 07:47 Well, the President of Eritrea, he did not believe in negotiation, the use of international law to resolve conflict. His way of resolving any conflict was through confrontation. That's all he knew. That's all he believed in. And Eritrea had the notoriety of being probably the only country in the world that had fought, that had a war, against every single neighbour it has. Because of this belief of the President. And unfortunately, being at the UN, I had to defend every war that I did not believe in. It was a difficult thing actually to do. Despite the fact that I had advised we should deal with the border issue with Ethiopia before the referendum for Eritrea, the border area that finally became the spark for the conflict, the war between us and Ethiopia, was left with the Ethiopians. They were administering it. They were managing. And then Isaias invaded and controlled it. This is the President of Eritrea, and he wouldn't withdraw. So I had the problem of having to defend why Eritrea must stay there. And I did make actually some proposals. He wouldn't listen. And in the end, Eritrea was forcibly driven out of that area by the Ethiopians. And I think that was the end of what I could tolerate being with that regime. And I decided to resign. Adam Cooper 09:30 And what did that mean for you and your family? Haile Menkerios 09:32 My passport was withdrawn and a letter was written to the UN never to employ me. But the Secretary-General didn't really listen because he knew exactly why I resigned from the government and just ignored the letter. And I was employed in the UN. Again, I had a problem because I was stateless. You know, my passport was withdrawn so I was stateless. But thanks to the South African government, actually, I was allowed to apply for asylum in South Africa and was given citizenship Adam Cooper 10:08 And I assume you haven't been able to go back home since then. Haile Menkerios 10:12 No. No, it wouldn't be possible. All those that said exactly what I said about the regime that was established, that we had to go for elections, that the Constitution must be implemented. We did say that openly in Parliament, challenged him, and except myself and another one who was the Minister of Defence, and another member of the Central Committee who was ambassador elsewhere. All the other of the 15 who were openly challenging him have been put in prison. Many of them really perished in prison. I was lucky to have been at the UN then. And so, when he said, you have to come back to Eritrea and resign here, I definitely was not that foolish. Wouldn't go. So any time if I was to return, that would have been my fate as well. I would go to prison. Adam Cooper 11:13 And it must have been painful, I assume, to lose your country to be stripped of the nationality of the country you had fought so hard to create. Haile Menkerios 11:23 Well, you can't imagine how devastating it is morally. And what you think is not the deprivation that you face personally alone. It is the failure of the goals for which so many of your comrades in arms fell, died, paid their life. We are a small people. And yet we faced a huge country, a huge army. Over 30 years of struggle. And you can imagine the hardships, the sacrifice, the loss of life actually, that cost. And then to be faced with a dictatorship, you ask: “Where did we fail? Where did we fail?”. Adam Cooper 12:12 Fortunately enough, the UN Secretary-General didn't accept that letter which the Eritrean President had written to him. And in 2000, you go and become the special advisor to the UN envoy to the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. You knew many of the protagonists and it sounds like you were stepping into quite a messy situation where the dialogue had really been quite unsuccessful to date in bringing together the three main parties to form this government. What were the, I guess, new approaches that you were recommending at that time to change the dynamic and to move it in a more inclusive direction where you could bring these three parties together? Haile Menkerios 12:54 I think the fact that one knew the personalities, the key personalities, actually there. I knew the young Kabila who became the new President very well, when his father was President. And that well gives one a little bit of edge. And to tell them, look, we've gone through this, you know. And war is devastating, really. Take it from me who's gone through it and have seen the horrors of war. I would like to believe it helped a little bit. But the key burden really was born by the South Africans who had both the clout and also the fact that they've gone through their struggle themselves. Everybody has gone through the struggle that they were going through and could therefore recount: “Listen, you better listen to us. Otherwise we know the consequences of continued war”. That was helpful. Adam Cooper 13:50 During this process you saw the importance of including women who would own their space, but also the difficulties of convincing others to bring them into a process. Tell me a bit more about that. Haile Menkerios 14:03 Women's inclusion is a critical aspect, actually, in the process of peacemaking. Women face the consequences of war, perhaps more than others in a society. But the question of women's participation should never be just for the sake of symbolism. It shouldn't be really tokenism simply to say “Women's issues are addressed. Women were there”. I think it should be meaningful participation of women. And for it to be meaningful, it has to be representation of those women who were actively fighting themselves to change society for the better. I advocated the women who should participate are the women inside Congolese society that were fighting for women's equal right to own property, for example. Land was owned by men, and as long as land is the means of survival, then they are dependent on men. And they were organised actuality to fight against that. I suggested that we should bring those kinds of women who fundamentally are there fighting for their rights to make sure that those rights are upheld by the new government. Unfortunately, what was done was the parties that were participating, they were asked to bring women representatives to join their parties. And you can imagine who they would bring. I did not support actually tokenism. I insisted that others should come, but I did not have that much power. I was not critical, actually in that process, and therefore it didn't happen actually that way. Although some women who were very strong and continued to fight for women's rights, women's equality later on were participating, although they didn't get to participate in the power that was established. Adam Cooper 16:04 It's an illustrative example, Haile, because it gets to what the responsibility of a mediator is in these situations where you can see what you think should be the case and you recommend it, but then others may not follow that advice. So what do you think a mediator should do when faced with that kind of tokenistic approach to women's participation in the process? Haile Menkerios 16:27 Well, you don't own the process, the parties that are negotiating own the process. And if it doesn't happen, that what you think is the maximalist position regarding the participation of women, the organisation of women, is not there, it’s just a reflection of the reality that was in that country, and therefore you cannot impose. You can only recommend. And then eventually try to propose in the agreements that are made that there are possibilities for that to happen as they implement in the future in the country. Anybody who reads that agreement now would think, my good God, I mean, it had so many women's interests represented in it, and then when it came to those issues being adopted, everybody said, “oh, oui oui oui oui c'est bon”. But they did not have an idea and inkling about implementing those. They were not implemented, you know, afterwards. So, you sort of accept the fact that society will only go at a pace which reflects where it is, rather than where one would want it to be. Adam Cooper 17:49 I want to move on to Sudan and later on, South Sudan, your longest and most substantial engagement as a mediator. In 2005, after years of fighting, the two sides sign landmark peace agreement that paves the way for a referendum on South Sudanese independence. And by the end of 2009, the two sides start talking more seriously about this referendum and you fly to Khartoum to talk to President al-Bashir. What did you have on your mind when you met him for the first time? Haile Menkerios 18:20 Fundamentally, personally, myself, I did not really think the best way to find a solution that would be beneficial to all Sudanese was the suppression of South Sudan. I felt a democratic Sudan that would allow the equal participation of the South Sudanese, as other marginalised communities in the country, in Darfur, in the east, was the best solution for the future. Sudan was like an Empire, you know. And Empires either democratises or disintegrates. So, the going of South Sudan, the independence, or the separation of South Sudan was almost an indication of the failure of Sudan to make unity attractive. So, in my mind, there was no question, after all that experience where South Sudanese felt like second class citizens in Sudan, that separation was inevitable. Therefore, I went there to make it as smooth as possible, as peaceful as possible. Adam Cooper 19:35 So you have this very real prospect of part of the country separating and becoming independent. And I'm just trying to imagine you put yourself in President al-Bashir's place where there's this possibility that a part of your country is going to become independent. You know, when you're sitting down with him for the first time, what did you say to kind of reassure the concerns that he must have had? Haile Menkerios 20:00 Well, what I did really is I was very straight with the Sudanese. I think that convinced him that I was not a supporter of the disintegration of Sudan. But it was too late by that time. And therefore, I tried to convince him, particularly when his party decided to contest in the referendum to advocate unity, to propagate that they should vote for unity. But I knew South Sudanese were decided, actually, they were going to go. They were going to separate. Adam Cooper 20:35 There was no point to cling on. Haile Menkerios 20:36 There was no point. So, what I said was, Mr. President, “you have to understand that the South Sudanese have decided to go. They will go. Whether you contest it or not, they will go. The question is whether you win a friendly South Sudan or an acrimonious South Sudan. And if you contest it, the only way you can, which is divide them, then you will have the acrimony of the new government in South Sudan. If, however, you just give them the chance, they will separate, but it could be a separation and less than a divorce”. I don't know if that is the only thing that convinced him, but just about a week later, he announced, he decided, we are not going to contest in the referendum. He went, in fact, to South Sudan and announced, we will respect whatever you decide. We will not contest it. We will support whatever you decide. If you decide independence, we will be the first country to recognise your independence. Adam Cooper 21:45 As a mediator you're required to engage with everyone. But for those who don't know the field as well, the idea of talking to a kind of strong man like President Omar al-Bashir, they might find it difficult to understand how to do that or how you convince someone in that kind of situation who's been in power so long. So what was the lesson that you drew from what arguments resonate with a man like that? Haile Menkerios 22:13 I think, first and foremost, is that politically good or bad, whether they represent a position that is entertained, supported or not supported by the international community, you've got to recognise that they are human beings and want as much as possible, representing the UN, to influence their thinking. And one obstacle actually, I had was that I was instructed not to interact with Bashir and his government except where it is absolutely necessary for the success of the mission. Now you can imagine. All right, what if he had the marriage of his daughter? Or the death of a close relative? Do I go or don't I go? Is this necessary for the success of the mission or not? I thought it was necessary. It was necessary. You can't be human, and interact whenever there is, but then become absolute inhuman. You are not a person to interact with socially otherwise. It was an impossible job. I was almost going to resign if that was to be forcibly entertained. If I had to follow that strictly, I wouldn't have been able to do what I felt I contributed. Adam Cooper 23:41 So, you chose to interpret it rather broadly, your mandate of what you consider to be necessary in an effort to connect with someone on a human level and not just in a meeting room. Haile Menkerios 23:51 Exactly. And secondly, you are sent to implement an agreement in collaboration with the government. You cannot do it actually, as an alternative force inside a government that you recognise is actually in power. If you're to influence it, you have to interact with it. And that interaction should not have limits more than that, actually, that is given to an ambassador sent there to win the friendship, win the collaboration of the government. Adam Cooper 24:25 Do you think that instinct still remains in the international community? To avoid leaders that they find distasteful even when they're in power and may need them for the resolution of a conflict? Haile Menkerios 24:38 Well, the question is we don't fight with our friends. We fight with our enemies. And if you are to come to a peaceful resolution of a conflict, you can't do it without including them without talking to them. Well, the same principles adopted by some government. “We don't talk with terrorists”. Well… So, do you have the capacity to defeat them? You would have done it if you did. Well, you didn't. And you can't destroy them. And so, try to find out if there are any commonalities. How can you mitigate at least if you cannot completely defeat. And sometimes you make those choices. You have to make those choices. Adam Cooper 25:24 You spoke earlier about some of the constraints that you faced at the UN in your engagement in Sudan and who you could and couldn't see in theory. Tell me more about what strengths you found as a UN mediator, but also the limitations that you faced. Haile Menkerios 25:41 I think in the end, you know, it's not just that you are a UN mediator, but you, the person and how the parties that are in conflict see you, also matters a lot. That you come with the weight of the UN definitely is a positive thing. That when you do say something, you are representing the UN Secretary-General and therefore it gives you that much weight. But your personality, your empathy, their trust in you as a person, that you are a fair person, irrespective of what instructions you come with, you try to rationalise them with them, given the situation one is facing. I think that is very, very critical, really in one's success. Adam Cooper 26:30 And after your long career with the UN, you join the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, or HD, where we're colleagues. How has working in private diplomacy as opposed to the UN, been different for you? Haile Menkerios 26:42 Well, I don't have to report every two weeks sometimes, no mandate restrictions, what you can do, what you can't do, who you can talk to, who you don't talk to. I think that type of freedom of action, although the objective is still the same, the method is totally differently. You have no power. You're not coming with an authority of some... It's only the better ideas that you can sort of advise them that it is advice, not imposition. It's you and what you can make those who are in conflict believe is the right thing to do. Adam Cooper 27:28 Almost using your powerlessness to an advantage. Haile Menkerios 27:30 That's it. That's exactly it. Adam Cooper 27:35 And when you think about the long arc of your career Haile, and studying in the US, becoming a freedom fighter, a diplomat, a mediator for so many years, and that, you know, you've during that time, helped so many others fight for peace in their countries. And today now unfortunately, you live in exile without the home you fought so hard for. Do you feel that that sacrifice was worth it? Haile Menkerios 28:04 Yes. Yes. And perhaps I could say, I wish I knew then what I know now. There were no institutional guarantees for a future democracy, for the transfer of power to the people of Eritrea. There wasn't enough about that. There was too much concern with winning the war, getting the mountain, the blockage out of the way. But we did not institute those guarantees that would allow people to participate in managing their own governance. The participation of people actually in that governance process. I would have changed that. Adam Cooper 28:53 And for young people who might be listening to this episode Haile, thinking of entering into this field, this slightly murky world of mediation. It's often kind of happening behind closed doors. What advice would you give to them if they felt that passion for peace and wanted to do something positive for their countries? Haile Menkerios 29:12 If you struggle in a committed way, to resolve conflict within different sectors of a society. Be it ethnic differences, be it class differences. This is what we see throughout history really. Wars follow wars and another war and then another war. But every time society moves forward, society moves to a better situation than what was before. And you can only encourage, actually, the youth never to stop believing in a better future. Adam Cooper 29:46 And for those things that seem so unlikely now but we hope for in the future. If you were able to return home one day. Do you think that that could happen? Haile Menkerios 29:57 I believe so. I am very hopeful for myself, for my children, for my family, for my relatives, for my compatriots, that that future is possible. That type of absolute dictatorship is bound to go. Is bound to go. And sooner or later I hope I will see it. But I wish it for my children. I wish it for the children of all those, my comrades in arms, who fought with the belief that it would be a better future for us and our children. Adam Cooper 30:34 On that hopeful note there we must end. Haile Menkerios, thank you so much for being my guest in the Mediator's Studio. Haile Menkerios 30:43 Thank you for having me. Adam Cooper 30:44 And there we end this edition of the Mediator's Studio. To get new episodes as soon as they're released make sure you subscribe. The Mediator’s Studio team loves hearing your feedback and suggestions. If you have a moment, please fill out our very short listener survey. You can find the link in the show notes and our website. You can also get in touch with me on Twitter @AdamTalksPeace. The Mediator’s Studio is an Oslo Forum podcast brought to you by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Our Managing Editor is Christina Buchhold and the show is produced by Christopher Gunness. Research for this episode was done by Eve Krassner and Jason Nemerovski. Neither peacemaking nor podcasts happen without lots of work behind the scenes. My thanks go to our whole production team in Geneva and in Oslo. I do hope that you'll join us for the next episode of the Mediator’s Studio. Until then, that's all for me, Adam Cooper. Thank you for listening.